This paper describes a natural framework for rules , bas ed on belief functions , which includes a repre sentation of numerical rules, default rules and rules allowing and rules not allowing contraposition. In particular it jus tifies the us e of th e Dempster-Sh afer Th eory for repres enting a particular class of rules , Belief calculated being a lower probability given cer tain independence assumptions on an underlying space. It shows how a belief function framework can be generalised to other logics, including a general Monte-Carlo algorithm for calculating belief, and how a version of Reiter's Default Logic can be seen as a limiting case of a belief function formalism.
Int roduction
Rules used by people are often not completely re liable so any attempt to represent them must cope with the conclusion of the rule sometimes being in correct. Numerical approaches do this by giving some kind of weighting to the conclusion of an un certain rule; non-monotonic reasoning, a symbolic approach, ensures that these rules are defeasible, so that their conclusions could later be retracted if nec essary. There has been little work done, however, on relat ing numerical and symbolic techniques, an exception being the work of Adams [Adams, 66] further devel oped by Geffner and Pearl [Geffner, 89; Pearl, 88] where a. logic is produced from probability theory, by tending the probabilities to 1. This paper shows how a belief function approach can represent numerical rules, both those allowing con traposition and those not allowing contra.position, and how default rules may be viewed as the lim iting case of such rules, when the certainty of the rule tends to 1. This allows the integration of the Dempster-Shafer Theory (DST) [Shafer, 76] and Re iter's Default Logic [Reiter, 80] , hence enhancing the understanding of both.
Section 2 deals with the representation of numeri cal rules within DST, 2.1 giving an interpretation of the type of rule that DST typically represents; 2.2 presents a belief function framework that allows the theory to be generalised to other logics, and 2.3 shows how the framework can be applied to include rules which don't allow contraposition. Section 3 deals with the representation of default rules within the framework: 3.1 reformulates Reiter's Default Logic and defines a modified extension (eq u ivalent to Lukaszewicz's); 3.2 shows how the belief function framework can be turned into a logic and 3.3 shows how to represent default rules within this logic. Sec tion 4 indicates how priorities between rules can be represented, and Section 5 suggests how numerical and default rules could be used together within the framework.
Numerical Rules
Expert Systems like MYCIN [Buchanan and Short liffe, 84) use uncertain rules of the form If a then c : (a-), where a-is the some measure of how reliable the rule is. There are many ways of interpreting such a rule. We consider a natural interpretation which leads to the standard Dempster-Shafer representa tion of rules.
J ustifying DST Representation of Rules
The standard way of representing ·the rules If a; then c; : (a-;) (for i= 1, ... , m) with the Dempster Shafer Theory is, for each rule to produce a simple support function with mass a-; allocated to the ma terial implication a; _. c; and the remaining mass 1 -o; allocated to the tautology, and then to com bine these simple support functions by repeated ap plication of Dempster's Rule. Pearl has criticised this representation for its behaviour under chaining and reasoning by cases. However it turns out that this DST approach represents a very natural type of rule. The uncertain rule may in fact be an approximation to the certain rule n/\a -+ c where n is an unknown antecedent or one too complicated to be easily ex pressed by the expert but which they judge to be true with probability o. After all '. . . uncertainty measures characterise invisible facts, i.e., exceptions not covered in the formulas' [Pearl, 88, p2] . Since n 1\ a -+ c is logically equivalent to n 1\ ..., c -+ ..., a, such a rule allows contraposition, and since it's also logically equivalent to n _. (a -+ c) , this rule may also be interpreted
If we represent such a rule by a simple support func tion, as described above, Belief is just the probability that we know a -+ c to be true, so that it's a lower probability for a -+ c. Similarly if we have a num ber of such rules, a; -+ c; ( i = 1, ... , m) , represent them as simple support functions and combine these with Dempster's Rule, Belief is a lower probability, given certain independence assumptions on the n;s. Consider now the typical Reasoning by Cases situa tion: we're given two rules If a then c: {Ql) and If -.a then c : (Q2) which we'll interpret as uncertain material implications n1 1\ a -+ c and n2 1\ -.a -+ c with Pr(n;) = Q;, i = 1, 2. Pearl argues that any reasonable measure of belief should obey the Sandwich Principle: deducing from those two rules that belief in c should be between Q1 and Q2; the Dempster-Shafer approach however gives that Bel( c ) = Q l Q2. But it is clear why the Sandwich Principle is violated for this approach: knowing either a or -.a increases our knowledge and hence our belief. In worlds where n1 1\ -.n2 is true, c may be always false if a is always false; in the event -.n1/\ n2, c may be always false if a is always true, and in the event -m1 1\ -.n2 there is no constraint on c so c may again always be false. Only in the event n1 1\ n2 can we be sure that c is true, so making the assumption of independence of n1 and n2 (which is reasonable without contrary knowledge) we get Bel( c) , the probability that we're in a world where we know c to be true, is Q1a2.
This type of rule can also be chained:
n1 1\ a -+ b and n2 1\ b -+ c with Pr(n;) = a;, (i = 1, 2) leads to (n1 1\ n2) 1\ a -+ c, and again assuming independence of n1 and n2 this gives Pr(n1/\n2) = a1a2. If we now learn that a is true we get Pr( c) � a1 a2 and so Bel( c) = a1 a2, the result given by application of Dempster's Rule. Of course the ass umption of independence of the n;s will not always be valid-if correlations between the rules are known they should be (and can be) incor porated.
The Dempster-Shafer approach is thus a natural, formally justified as well as a computationally ef ficient way (see [Wilson, 89] and section 2.2) to rep resent If-Then rules.
The Sources of Evidence Framework
We will be interested in extending DST to other log ics (see [Saffioti, 90] for other work on this, and see [Ruspini, 87] for a justification of DST using a modal 444 logic of knowledge). A natural way to extend Demp ster's multi-valued mapping [Dempster, 67] is as fol lows:
We have a mutually exclusive and exhaustive set 0 with a probability function P on it, and we're inter ested in the truth of formulae in L, where L is the language of some logic. With each 7] E n is associ ated a set K'1 (� L): the set of all formulae known to be true given that '7 is true. For a formula dE L, Bel( d) is defined to be the probability that we know d to be true i.e.,
Justifying Dempster's Rule for general belief func tions is problematic* so we restrict ourselves to the combination of a finite number of simple support functions and, to justify this, use the Sources of Ev idence framework (based on Shafer's random sources canonical example [Shafer, 87] ; see [Wilson, 89] for details).
Suppose we have distinct propositions n;, i = 1, ... , m, (not in L) and for each we have a prior probability Q;. Suppose also that we know that if n; is true, some evidence Evd; is also true, where Evd; is a statement about the logic (it might for example be that the material implication a; -+ c; is true, as in section 2.1). If n; is not true we know nothing about the truth of Evd;.
We also allow there to be a set of facts W which are known certainly to be true. n; may, as the name of the framework suggests, rep resent the event that a source of evidence, which tells us evidence Evd;, is reliable. Alternatively n; may be an unknown antecedent of a rule, as described in the last section; or ni may just be some event for which, when it occurs, we are sure that the evidence Evd; is true. Let 'lu be the elementary event 1\ n; A 1\ -.n;
and let n be the mutually exclusive and exhaus tive set of elementary events { T/u : u � { 1, ... m} } .
Take some probability function P on 0.
* For example there is the problem of the collaps ing of the Belief-Plausibility interval, e.g., [Pearl, 89] ; see also Shafer's presentations of his random codes canonical example, with discussion [Shafer, 82a, 82b] . If we think ofP as saying, for each 1]11, the probability that we are in a world in which f111 is true, then Bel( d) is the probability that we are in a world in which we know d is true. Bel maybe viewed as a lower probability given the probability function P on the underlying space n.
It is argued in [Wilson, 89] that, in the absence of correlation information on the n;s, certain assump tions (A) and (B) are entirely reasonable. (A) is roughly that, since an unreliable source/rule doesn't give us any information, it shouldn't affect the prob abilities (an example of the application of this as sumption is given below in 2.3); (B) is that, if the sources are not contradictory (i.e., /\';' n; is not known to be impossible) then we take, for each i, P(n;) to be a;, its prior value. These assumptions determine a unique probability function P 08 given by
where
This is, in fact, the probability function that leads to Dempster-Shafer belief when each Evd; is that some proposition p; is true: the belief as defined above will be the same as that calculated by using Dempster's Rule to combine simple support functions with mass a ; attributed to the proposition p;, i = 1, ... , m.
Since Belief, as defined here, is just 'randomised logic' the calculation of Belief inherits its compu tational efficiency from that of the underlying logic: Bel( d) can be calculated, using the following Monte Carlo algorithm:
For each trial:-(i) Pick u with probability P(q.,) (ii) If K., 3 d then trial succeeds else trial fails. The proportion of successful trials then converges to Bel( d).
Given that P( '1u) is not too hard to calculate, the calculation takes time proportional to the time it takes to check if d E Kt!, but with a fairly large constant term corresponding to the number of trials needed to get reasonable accuracy. With the probability function P = P 05 , step (i) can be performed very easily. Since any sensible measure 445 of belief should collapse to the logic for the extreme case, its computational efficiency cannot hope to be better than that of the underlying logic. Thus the calculation of Dempster-Shafer belief is as fast, up to a constant, as the calculation of a measure of belief could possibly be. In particular it is shown in [Wil son, 89] that (up to arbitrary accuracy) Dempster Shafer Belief on a mutually exclusive and exhaustive frame of discernment can be calculated in time a p proximately linear in the number of evidences and size of the frame of discernment.
Rules Not Allowing Contraposition
Some rules do not allow contraposition. For exam ple the rule Typically males don't have long beards seems reasonable, and even mildly informative, but on meeting someone with a long beard, it would be unreasonable to deduce that they were female. In order to represent rules not allowing contraposition, inference rules such as a/ c will be used which, like the rules used in many Expert Systems, given a, al low the deduction of c, but given -.c, do not allow -.a to be deduced. Suppose we have a set of rules If a; then c; : (a;) for i = 1, ... , m, (a;s and c;s closed wffs in first order logic) for which we do not wish to allow contraposition. Let I = {a; / c; : i = 1 , ... , m} where the (certain) inference rule a; I c; means 'if we know a; we can deduce c/, and let I., = {a; I c; :
ieu}.
For some set U of closed wffs and set of inference rules J we define Th1 (U) to be the logical closure of U when all the inference rules in J are added to the logic i.e., the set of formulae obtained by applying all the inference rules in J repeatedly to U, so that Th1 (U) is the smallest set r such that (i) r 2 u, (ii) Th(r) = r and (iii ) if a I c E J and a E r then c E r'
where Th(r) means the logical closure of r within first order logic.
Abbreviate Th1 .. (W) to Th17(W).
To represent this set of rules within the sources of evidence framework we make the ith evidence be that the inference rule ai I c; is added to the logic (so that whenever a; is known, c; may be deduced).
To be precise, we set K., to be Tht! (W). This includes the uncertain material implications, described in 2.1, as a special case: make, for all i, the ith inference rule equal T I (a; -c; ).
Example
Whilst attempting to deduce information about our acquaintance Nixon we learn that he is a quaker and a republican, so that W = {quaker,republican}. Two rules, If quaker then pacifist : Ca-1) and If republican then -,pacifist : (a-2) are also known.
To represent these we take Evd1 to be that the first rule is correct and that the corresponding inference rule quaker /pacifist should be added to the logic, and similarly for Evd2. Thus if n1 then, if at any time we learn quaker, we will deduce pacifist. This gives Ke = Th(W) = Th( {quaker, republican})
pacifist}).
Since K{1,2} is inconsistent, P(nt /\n2) must be 0. In order to come up with a probability function P we make certain independence assumptions. Knowing only about one rule, the first, we would obviously take P(n1) = a-1; adding an unreliable second rule doesn't give us any information so shouldn't change this probability i.e., we make the assumption that P(n1l..,n2) = O't. Symmetrically we make the as sumption P(n2j-.nt) = a-2. Both these assumptions are instances of ass umption (A) mentioned above in 2.2. Only in worlds when n1 1\ -.n2 is true (when u = {1}) do we know pacifist, and only in worlds -.nl 1\ n2 (u = {2}) do we know -.pacifist, so If the reliabilities of the two rules are the same then Bel(pacifist) = Bel(-.pacifiat). If, on the other hand, the first rule is very reliable, but the second isn't so reliable then Bel(pacifist) will be close to 1 and Bel( -.pacifist) will be close to 0.
44· 6 3. Default Rules
An alternative to rules with numerical uncertainty are default rules-in the absence of information in dicating that the circumstances are exceptional, the rule is fired, though the consequence of the rule may later have to be retracted, if it's discovered that cir cumstances are in fact exceptional.
Default Logic
Reiter's Default Logic [Reiter, 80) is a logic for rea soning with default rules. A default rule is a rule of the form 'If we know a then deduce c, as long as b is consistent', or a : b I c for short. In default logic the extensions are intended to be the different possible completions, using the default rules, of an incomplete set of facts about the world. Definition: E is said to be an M-extension of .0. if E is a maximal .6.-consistent set inS. Theorem 3: Let � be a closed normal default theory. Then E is an extension of Ll if and only if E is a maximally �-consistent set in S.
Thus for closed normal default theories E is an ex tension if and only if E is an M-extension. M-extensions have for general closed default theories the nice properties extensions only have for closed normal default theories:
Theorem 4: Every closed default theory has an M-extension.
Theorem 5 (Semi-monotonicity):
. If E is an M-extension of � then there exists an M-extension E' of�' with E' ;;2 E.
We ca.n also define an M-default proof, in a.n obvious way, which is complete, that is for any dosed wff p there is an M-default proof of p if and only if p E E for some M-extension E. It might be suggested that any M-extension of a de fault theory which is not an extension is not a sen sible completion of one's knowledge: this however is not the case e.g., there are apparently coherent default theories that allow no extension (see [Wil son, 90] for an example, and also for proofs of the above results) but which, by Theorem 4, allow M extensions. M-extensions turn out to be the modified extensions defined in [Lukaszewicz, 84] (also see [Besnard, 89] ).
The Sources of Evidence Framework as a Logic
To turn the Sources of Evidence Framework into a Logic, we tend the reliabilities of the sources (the a is) to 1. B-extensions are the sets of formulae whose belief can be made to tend to 1. We can consider Bel as a function Bel(g:,p) where .9: = (at. a2, ... , am) is the vector consisting of the re liabilities of all the sources. To use the Sources of Evidence framework to pro duce a logic we require that for any closed wff p, Bel(p) tends to either 0 or 1. A B-extension is then the set of formulae whose belief tends to 1. 
Example Continued
In the case of Nixon we have 2 B-extensions. When the reliability of the first rule tends to 1 much faster than that of the second rule we get that Bel(pacitist) tends to 1, and Bel(-.paci:fist) tends to 0 so K{l} = Th(W U {pacifist}) is a B extension. Similarly K{2} = Th(W U {-.pacifist}) is a B extension. If we don't have information about correlations be tween the sources we can reasonably make assump tions (A) and (B) giving p = p 08 .
Theorem 7: With P = P 08 , Ei sa B-extension if and only if E = K 17 for some u maximal with K 17 consistent.
Representation of Default Rules in

Sources of Evidence Framework
Default rules will be represented in the Sources of Evidence framework by treating them rather like nu merical rules with a high, but unknown, certainty: roughly speaking we make the ith evidence Evd; be that the inference rule ai I C i is a correct rule, as we did in 2.3, and take the limit as the reliabilities of the sources (that is, the certainties of the rules) tend to 1, to produce the B-extensions. In the example we found that the B-extensions were just the same as Reiter's extensions. This was no co incidence: when the probability function pDS on 0 is used the B-extensions are exactly the M-extensions of the default theory.
Closed Normal Default Theories
Let � be a closed normal default theory. We want the ith evidence to be that the inference rule ai I Ci is a correct rule, so, formally, we set Kt? = Th 17 (W), and also set P = P 08 .
Theorem 8: Let � be a closed normal default the ory. With the above representation of Closed Nor mal Default rules within the Sources of Evidence framework
General Closed Default Theories
We again set P = P05. To represent the consistency condition b; we have to be a little trickier. We fi rst add new distinct symbols q1, ... , qm to the alphabet of the language to get a new language L'.
We want the statement of the ith source to be that inferences rules a; / q;, q; / c;, -.b; / -.q; are correct rules. The idea is that knowing a; will enable us to deduce c; unless -.b; is known, in which case we will get an inconsistency since we'll know both q; and -.q;.
To be precise we let K� � L' be the theorems of W when the inference rules a; q;
-.b;
.
are added to the logic, that is, K� �rTh'"' (W).
We're only interested in the wffs in L so let Ku be K� n L, so that Ku is K� stripped of all formulae mentioning some q;.
This gives the following result:
Theorem 9: With the representation of Default rules in the Sources of Evidence framework described above, for any set of closed wffs E E is a B-extension if and only if E is an M-extension.
Expressing Preferences between Rules
Suppose we have two rules, If penguin then -.:flies : (al), and If bird then :flie1 :
Co2), and two facts, W ={penguin, bird}.
Expressing these as inference rules gives, as in the Nixon example, ansmg from ass umptions P(n1l...., n2) = o1, P(n2 1-. n l ) = a2.
But since we know that penguins are a subclass of birds it seems that the first rule should override the second: if we only knew about the first rule we would get Bel( -.:flies) = 01 which should not be changed on learning the second rule.
The preference of some sets of rules over others are represented by making some different assumptions 448 on the probability function P that reflect that pref erence.
In this case we specify P(nl) = o1 (since P(n1) should be unaff ected by the addition of a second rule), and P(n2l...., n1) = 02 is still an intuitive as sumption to make.
This gives P(n1 A n2) = 0, since K{l,2} is inconsis tent, P(n1 A -.n2) = 01, P(-.nl A n2) = (1 -ol)a2, P(-.nlA-.n2) = (1-ol)(l-o2), and Bel(-.:flies) = o1, Bel(:flies) = (1-al)o2.
Here Th( {penguin, bird, -.flies}) is the only B extension.
Combining Numerical and Default Rules
It has been shown how the Sources of Evidence framework can represent either numerical rules, or, taking the limit as the reliabilities of the rules tend to 1, default rules. The next step is to combine both within this framework.
Suppose that our knowledge includes both default rules and numerical rules. First we represent both as evidences, which add an inference rule to the logic, in the sources of evidence framework (which includes the contrapositioning rules as a special case). We first consider only the default rules, and produce the B-extensions. Then we add the other rules/sources to get a belief function in each B-extension.
For dE L, BEL . 
Concluding Comments
We have given counter-arguments to some of Pearl's criticisms of the use of belief functions to represent rules and argued that the Dempster-Shafer Theory is a natural way to represent a type of If-Then rule.
If it is known that the rules are correlated, then the independence ass umptions may well not be justified, and so a more general belief function approach such as the sources of evidence framework is needed to allow the dependencies between the rules to be in corporated in the underlying probability function P.
Dependencies must also be used, as described in sec tion 4, to represent dominance of certain rules (or chains of rules) over others. We have shown that this belief function approach also enables the repre sentation of default rules. Another very natural type of rule H a then c : (a) related to that described in 2.1 is where, again, there is an unknown antecedent n with n 1\ a -c, but instead of knowing the prior probability of n, we know the conditional probability P(n la) = a. With a number of such rules we can take, as before, Belief as a lower probability, tend the a;s to 1 and see which Beliefs tend to 1. This is effectively the approach taken by Adams, Geffner and Pearl. It would be interesting to explore whether progress can be made by making independence assumptions on the n; s, as we did for the type of rule described in 2.1.
It is clear that there is no single correct way of rep resenting numerical If-Then rules. Future research in this area should attempt to clarify wha.t different types of numerical rule there are, a.nd to represent them within a single framework.
